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CHAPTER 4 
Contracts and Agency 
PAUL M. SISKIND 
A. CONTRACTS 
§4.1. Impossibility of performance: Restitution. There is no 
doubt that by virtue of the historic employment of identical procedure 
for recovery in express or implied contract in the common counts and 
for recovery in noncontractual situations involving restitution, statu-
tory obligations, and other forms of the so-called "quasi-contractual" 
obligations there exists in no other field of law commonly practiced 
more confusion and more misconception than in the area of recoveries 
in Massachusetts practice under the common counts of quantum 
meruit and quantum valebat. An illuminating opinion by Justice 
Whittemore in the significant case of Ahern Co. v. John Bowen CO.l 
remakes distinctions recently obscured or forgotten. More than that, 
however, the decision definitively clarifies Massachusetts law on the 
issue of quasi-contractual recovery when there has been no direct 
material benefit to the defendant. 
In the Ahern case, the plaintiff, as a subcontractor, had furnished 
labor and materials under a contract with the defendant, which con-
tract referred specifically to compliance with a basic contract between 
the defendant and the Commonwealth. The contract between the 
defendant and the Commonwealth was declared void in the case of 
Gifford v. Commissioner of Public Health2 on the basis that the 
awarding authority had substantially deviated from the statutory 
procedure with respect to the creation of such contract. As a result 
of the Gifford case, the contract between the plaintiff and the de-
fendant was void as "impossible of performance." The Supreme 
Judicial Court held, however, that "the absence of an express provision 
in the contract to cover the unexpected contingency has not deterred 
this court or other American courts from giving recovery in cases of 
excusable impossibility for such performance as has been received." a 
(Emphasis supplied.) 
PAUL M. SISKIND is Professor of Law at Boston University School of Law and a 
member of the Massachusetts and Federal Bars. 
§4.1. 11956 Mass. Adv. Sh. 459. 133 N.E.2d 484. 
2328 Mass. 608. 105 N.E.2d 476 (1952). 
31956 Mass. Adv. Sh. 459. 461. 133 N.E.2d 484. 485. The Court quoted 6 Williston 
on Contracts §1977 (rev. ed. 1938). 
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The defendant, conceding this, argued that the theory of quasi-
contractual recovery for services, labor, or materials furnished under 
a contract so voided has as its basis the doctrine of restitution, for 
benefits received by the other party under such a situation which 
otherwise would be unjustly retained by him. The Court stated 
categorically that the cases permitting recovery in such situations are 
not "based in the ultimate analysis on the principle of unjust enrich-
ment ... wherein recovery is limited to benefits received." 4 Rather, 
said the Court, recovery seems to have been based on an implication 
that proportionate payment was to be made for that which was re-
ceived. The Court rejected the benefit theory, unless it was enlarged 
and given a meaning "wider than is natural." It rejected flatly the 
proposition that that which was received by the defendant must 
necessarily be of pecuniary value to him. It adopted a statement by 
Professor Williston that "a recovery on a quantum meruit or quantum 
valebat should prima facie be such a proportion of the price as the 
work which the plaintiff has done bears to the full amount of the 
work for which the [voided] contract provided." 5 It must be noted, 
however, that the Court expressly found the defendant partially re-
sponsible for the circumstances which resulted in the voiding of the 
underlying contract between these parties. This was the factor which 
enabled the Court to say that it was "clearly fair and just" to require 
the defendant to pay, even though the defendant would then suffer 
uncompensable loss. 
The doctrine of the case would appear to be that a party to a 
contract now impossible of performance may have quasi-contractual 
recovery in the common counts, even though the defendant received 
no material benefit, where the defendant was in some measure respon-
sible for the voiding of the contract. Thus, it would appear that all 
the elements of restitution are required as a basis for such recovery 
except the concept of material benefit. It would likewise appear that 
were the defendant in no way responsible for the situation resulting in 
the legal impossibility, no recovery would be granted. This case, then, 
might well lead to the establishment of a much needed clear-cut under-
standing that the employment of the common counts for noncontrac-
tual recovery must fall into one of three defined categories: (1) 
statutory obligations; (2) traditional rights in restitution; or (3) pro-
portionate recovery for part performance of contracts voided in course. 
§4.2. Interpretation of general releases: Mutual mistake. Massa-
chusetts attorneys who have traditionally treated general releases as 
sacrosanct may well rest uneasy after the decision in Century Plastic 
Corp. v. Tupper Corp.l The parties were in the course of litigation 
of an account between them orginating in 1946 and were proceeding to 
settle it after extended negotiations which concerned this account only. 
4 1956 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 461, 133 N.E.2d at 485. 
I) 1956 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 462, 133 N.E.2d at 486. 
§4.2. 1333 Mass. 531, 131 N.E.2d 740 (1956). 
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Prior to the settlement, another account originated between them in 
1950 (through shipment from a separately located division of the plain-
tiff to the defendant's agents). In the course of settlement, the plain-
tiff executed and delivered to the defendant a formal general release 
in the broadest terms covering "all claims" which the plaintiff then 
had against the defendant. Upon the plaintiff's petition, and not-
withstanding the unambiguous terms of the release, the Court sustained 
the action of the equity court below in reforming the release so as to 
exclude from its terms the claim for the 1950 account, on the grounds 
of mistake. The Court based its finding of mistake on the fact that at 
no time during negotiations was the 1950 account ever mentioned; 
never was there any dispute relative to the amount or conditions of 
the 1950 account; and, more significantly, the settlement was less than 
the amount claimed on the 1946 account alone. The Court treated 
the mistake as being mutual in that the plaintiff's "mistaken" use 
of the term "all claims" should have been recognized as such by the 
defendant. To the defendant's argument that the plaintiff's negligence 
should not relieve it from its contractual obligations, the Court stated 
that the plaintiff's conduct did not amount to "inexcusable negligence 
barring the plaintiff from maintaining the suit." 2 The everyday 
practice of using the "all claims" release seems to have proceeded on 
the basis that such release would be inviolate. It is suggested that 
the practitioner commonly gives such release upon the conscious cal-
culated risk that he may be discharging claims the existence of which 
he has no knowledge. The extent to which this case may eliminate 
that risk appears to be substantial; yet, it would seem to reopen 
a considerable number of claims previously treated as barred. The 
draftsman had best redraft his release.8 
§4.3. "Promise to pay when able" contracts. The textbooks and 
the practitioners have often been at odds as to what is properly in-
cludable in that category of promises called "illusory," a type of 
promise characterized as being too vague and indefinite to be enforce-
able.1 The issue on one of the most common of these was joined in 
the case of Smith v. Graham Refrigeration Products CO.,2 wherein 
the plaintiff sought to recover an amount of salary voted to him which 
was, by the terms of such vote, not to be paid "until the defendant's 
financial condition warranted such payment." 8 The Court quite 
properly characterized the promise as being, in essense, a promise "to 
pay when able," determined that such a promise was not too vague or 
uncertain to be enforceable, and indicated that it was a conditional 
promise and would be enforceable only on proof that the ability to pay 
existed. As opposed to a promise to pay "when money is needed," 
281111 Mass. at 5116, Illl N.E.2d at 7411. 
a At least, perhaps, to add the phrase "whether or not demand has been made 
or the claim otherwise has been referred to by the parties." 
§4.!1. 1 See 1 Restatement of Contracts §§2, 79. 
2 !l88 Mass. 181, 129 N.E.2d 884 (1955). 
a 888 Mass. at 182, 129 N.E.2d at 885. 
3
Siskind: Chapter 4: Contracts and Agency
Published by Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School, 1956
§4.4 CONTRACTS AND AGENCY 45 
which has been held illusory as being too subjective a standard, the 
promise to "pay when able" would appear to have sufficiently objective 
elements to be determinable. It is curious to note that the Court 
considered that this sort of promise presented greater difficulties when 
made by a corporation than when made by an individual. It would 
seem that the very standards and tests of ability which the Court im-
poses would be in any event more clearly defined in the case of a 
corporation than in the case of the individual with many responsibili-
ties and obligations collateral to and independent of his business 
transactions. In any event, the standards established in the case will 
present a workable test for this type of promise, which is one of sub-
stantial practical importance in small corporate employment trans-
actions. This requires proof by the plaintiff that "the funds of the 
defendant were of such amount, in excess of current expenses and 
such reserves of cash accumulated in the busy seasons as were required 
to carry the business during slack periods, as would permit withdrawals 
without prejudice to the current conduct of the corporate business." 4 
It might be suggested that bank credit or other forms of normal financ-
ing applicable to seasonal operations might be substituted for cash 
reserves. 
§4.4. Acts constituting waiver of written conditions. It has been 
traditionally axiomatic in Massachusetts contract jurisprudence that 
"conditions bite hard." Today, apparently, we should qualify that 
statement by adding "depending upon the nature of the condition." 
Illustrative of this is the case of Staples Coal Co. v. Ucello1 which con-
cerned, in part, the interpretation of a provision involving waiver. 
The written agreement between the parties provided that it should 
constitute "the entire agreement between the company and the pur-
chaser, and no provision of this contract may be altered or waived 
except by a written instrument duly executed by the parties hereto." 2 
(Emphasis supplied.) Among other subsequent deviations alleged, it 
was proved that work had been done by subcontractors other than those 
specifically authorized to perform. The record indicates that the 
defendant "first learned of this change when he saw ... [the un-
authorized subcontractor's] ... men working on the job but made 
no objection after learning of that fact." 3 
The Court, without citation of authority, simply concluded that the 
record indicated that the defendant had waived any right which he 
may have had to object to the use of these subcontractors. The con-
dition that any waiver must be in writing was presumably considered 
to have itself been waived, leaving the status of such waiver provision 
definitely subordinate to the ordinary conduct of the parties, and, to 
all intents and purposes, as ineffective as if it had not been drafted. 
This construction is not novel. It appears surprising, however, that 
it is so taken for granted. 
4333 Mass. at 185, 129 N.E.2d at 886. 
§4.4. 1333 Mass. 464, 131 N.E.2d 763 (1956). 
2111111 Mass. at 465, 1111 N.E.2d at 764. 
3 Ibid. 
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§4.5. Concurrent conditions: Temporal and instantaneous acts. 
The law as to dependency of covenants has traveled a long tortuous 
path from the original English doctrine of complete independence 
of all covenants to the present rules of construction which would 
tend to find dependency as the normal intent of the parties wherever 
possible.1 In Vander Realty Co. v. Gab,riel,2 the Court was called 
upon to apply such rules to a real estate agreement which contained 
a covenant, in form and position unrelated to any particular portion of 
the draft agreement, that the seller agreed to "tar surface of roadway 
to town ... [specifications]." 3 The trial court found that the 
promise to surface the road was not a condition precedent to the buy-
er's obligation to perform. 
The Supreme Judicial Court held this finding to be revers able error, 
referring to this condition as "concurrent." It would seem that the 
decision was eminently sound, but that the description of the 
covenants as being conditions "concurrent" would tend to perpetuate 
confusion. If the nature of the covenants in question were analyzed 
to determine whether or not the acts involved were "temporal" acts, 
i.e., acts involving any period of time for performance, or "instanta-
neous" acts, the Court could reach with clarity of position the correct 
result by a simple application of a rule that, unless otherwise expressly 
state(!, a temporal act will be presumed to be precedent to an in-
stantaneous act.4 To characterize a time-consuming covenant as "con-
Clf.:ent" with an instantaneous act leaves considerable doubt as to 
\\: .en, during the performance of the temporal act, the instantaneous 
act should be performed. 
The case also reiterated the Court's earlier position that tender of 
- erformance is not necessary where the other party "has shown that 
i!e cannot or will not perform," 5 and said that the buyer was excused 
trom tendering the price when, at the time for passing, the seller 
had demonstrated his inability to perform by having failed to tar the 
road. The cautious, with good reason, still tender and demand. 
§4.6. Conditions precedent in real estate purchase and sales con-
tracts. An increasingly prevalent practice, and one which is most es-
sential in the money market of the moment, is the inclusion in real 
estate purchase and sale contracts of a provision making the purchase 
conditional upon the buyer'S ability to procure a mortgage or mort-
gages in specified amounts and on specified terms. Such a provision 
came up for construction in Sorota v. Baskin,l wherein the particular 
issue was concerned with the extent to which the buyer was required 
to "make efforts" to procure the specified mortgages. The buyer 
~4.5. l3 Williston on Contracts §§816 et seq. (rev. ed. 1938). 
:I 1956 Mass. Adv. Sh. 731, 134 N.E.2d 901. 
31956 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 732. 134 N.E.2d at 902. 
4 The duty to perform the "instantaneous" act (as. payment) would arise on no-
tice of the completion of the "temporal" act. 
Ii 1956 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 734. 134 N.E.2d at 903. 
§4.6. 11956 Mass. Adv. Sh. 553. 134 N.E.2d 428. 
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had visited the assistant treasurer of the designated bank and made his 
request, and had at a later date visited the treasurer of the same bank, 
which latter officer was authorized to make the commitment. After 
consideration by both he was rejected and did nothing further until 
the date set for passing. The Court said that the buyer was not 
required, as a matter of law, to do any more than he did, and specifi-
cally noted that he was under no duty to "continue to endeavor to 
procure ... [the loan] ... up to the date of the performance of 
the agreement." 2 In short, the record of the buyer's efforts in this 
case was sufficient for the jury to find that he had used "due diligence" 
and made "reasonable efforts." It would seem that a bona fide request 
of an authorized officer of a designated lending agency will in itself 
satisfy the condition. Where the particular lending agency is not 
designated, it is suggested that such requests of three or more reputable 
local lending agencies would meet the condition. This decision would 
seem to be in accord with good business practices. 
B. AGENCY 
§4.7. Insurance adjuster: Agency status. The agency status of an 
insurance adjuster, if questionable before, was made crystal clear by 
the Court in MacKeen v. Kasinskas.1 The adjuster for the defendant's 
insurance company told the plaintiffs that they "would not have to 
bother with getting a lawyer or suing the company as the insurance 
company would take care of everything." The plaintiffs, allegedly in 
reliance on this statement, did not retain counsel and did not institute 
suit until after the statutory period had run. When the defendant 
pleaded the statute of limitations to the suit, the plaintiffs asserted that 
by virtue of the representations of the adjuster, the defendant should 
be estopped from setting up the statute of limitations. The Court, 
quoting from an earlier Court of Appeals case2 which applied Mas-
sachusetts substantive law, said: "'The only authority which the 
agent need have to constitute his conduct an estoppel is the authority 
to promise a settlement. It is clear that all insurance adjusters have 
at least apparent authority to make promises of settlement: "3 
(Emphasis supplied.) The Court applied the estoppel and the case 
went to the merits. 
The unusual feature of the case, however, is that despite the state-
ment of the Court that an insurance adjuster has "at least apparent 
authority" to settle claims, the Court distinguished the case from the 
earlier Massachusetts case of Ford v. Rogovin,4 in which the insurance 
adjuster had told the plaintiff's attorney that he would "see to it that 
his insurance company would settle the case," on the basis that there 
21956 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 555, 134 N.E.2d at 430. 
§4.7. 1333 Mass. 695, 132 N.E.2d 732 (1956). 
2 Bergeron v. Mansour, 152 F.2d 27 (1st Cir. 1945). 
3333 Mass. 695, 697, 132 N.E.2d 732, 733 (1956). 
4289 Mass. 549. 194 N.E. 719 (1935). 
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was no evidence in that case that the adjuster had any authority to 
bind his insurer and the plaintiff's attorney knew of this lack of au-
thority. If apparent authority exists, as stated so flatly by the Court 
in this case, it is difficult to understand why evidence of authority 
would be required of the plaintiff to establish the basis for the estoppel. 
§4.8. Apparent authority and reliance. The case of Simonelli v. 
Boston Housing Authorityl restates familiar agency doctrine in holding 
that managers of a housing project have no implied or apparent au-
thority to bind the Authority to life employment contracts with 
watchmen and maintenance personnel, and further held that state-
ments to the plaintiff by the managers that he could "stay on the job 
as long as he was healthy, as long as he felt like working, and as long 
as he desired," would not constitute a promise of permanent employ-
ment, but were rather "a hopeful encouragement sounding only in 
prophecy." 2 
The reported facts of the case, however, leave a definite impression 
of a resulting hardship. The plaintiff, who was employed as a watch-
man and maintenance laborer by the Housing Authority when he was 
sixty-two years of age, later sought counsel of the managers as to 
whether or not he should join a retirement program, which program 
would make it mandatory upon him to retire at seventy. The man-
agers advised him not to join the program and in that connection 
made the statements above referred to. If there were any possibility 
that the courts of this state might accept the doctrine of promissory 
estoppel as set forth in Section 90 of the Restatement of Contracts,S 
there seems little doubt that these were statements which would 
qualify as having induced a substantial and definite reliance. This is 
evidenced by the fact that plaintiff signed a written waiver of mem-
bership in the program which was witnessed by one of the managers 
involved. Now, at age seventy-three, he is discharged, allegedly for lack 
of funds, and with no retirement benefits. It would seem questionable 
that he could be expected to appreciate either the fact that men who 
were his superiors, carrying titles of "manager" and "personnel direc-
tor," had no authority to make such commitments or the fact that 
these statements made in connection with specific advice not to join 
the retirement program would be held by the law to be advisory and 
non promissory, leaving him without recourse to anyone. 
§4.8. 11956 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1049, 137 N.E.2d 670. 
21956 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1050, 137 N.E.2d at 672. 
S Despite expressions of repudiation, it would seem certain that the Massachusetts 
law of charitable subscriptions follows the doctrine squarely. 
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